To Forge New Hammers of Justice: Deep-Six the Doing-Teaching Dichotomy and Embrace the Dialectic of  Doing Theory by Bezdek, Barbara L.
TO FORGE NEW HAMMERS OF JUSTICE: DEEP-SIX THE
DOING-TEACHING DICHOTOMY AND EMBRACE THE
DIALECTIC OF "DOING THEORY"
BARBARA L. BEZDEK*
This essay is a reflection on the relationships between law and
social movement, and their importance for legal education in the
oughties. It is a response to remarks of Steve Wizner and Jane Aiken
at the celebration of the University of Maryland's first thirty years of
commitment to experiential education in the service of poor and
unrepresented people. Steve and Jane eloquently articulated the
tensions that inhere within law schools' experiential programs in
expanding justice today. Steve asks whether the institutional shift
from practicing law with self-selected students in legal services offices
independent of law schools, to running law school clinics as faculty
members with multiple commitments, too deeply compromises "our
identities as advocates for the poor and unprivileged, as fighters for
social justice."' Jane modulates his query's pointedness with equal
parts realism and respect for each individual clinician finding his or
her own place within the dichotomy they characterize as 'teaching
versus doing.' Posed in this manner, the challenge merits somber
deliberation among those who recognize the roots of clinical legal
education in the emancipation efforts of the War on Poverty. Today, a
sizeable corps of clinical faculty is fanned out across most of legal
education in the U.S; how should we evaluate this stunning inroad into
the traditions of law schooling? This timely and important question is
aimed at clinical legal education in the aggregate, beyond individual
clinicians' private tradeoffs.
In this essay I want to consider the thesis that clinical legal
education, in the aggregate, has abandoned the commitments of the
War on Poverty era to garner a warm place by the academic fire. If the
Ford Foundation-funded Council for Legal Education and Professional
Responsibility (CLEPR) were to re-evaluate the effectiveness of the
clinical branch of legal education in 2004, would it find its original
purpose-to engage the law schools to redress the legal problems of
the poor and disenfranchised-sufficiently well-met to justify the
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program?2 Would clinical programs' effectiveness on behalf of the
poor compare favorably to clinical education's impressive growth and
acceptance in academia?
To pursue this program evaluation, we need some yardstick.
Several potential assessment measures can be inferred from our
speakers' remarks. The first two are quantity measures, and are the
easiest, most familiar, and the least enlightening in a meaningful
evaluation: (1) Quantification of legal service to the poor (caseloads,
clients "served," the number of students involved in the work, the
number of lawyer and law student hours deployed); and (2) Evidence
as to the social or market value of the legal work provided, such as the
dollar value of that work had it been billed by lawyers in private
practice, or fees earned in fee-shifting matters. Additional desirable
outcome measures, far more difficult to obtain, compile, and interpret,
would include: (3) Examination of substantive outcomes (matters won
or lost, substantive results achieved for clients, rule-changes gained or
prevented, client satisfaction, or other -outcome measures); (4) Impacts
on students (the number of students who seek similar work, later in
law school, and upon graduation, whether paid or pro bono); and (5)
the intellectual capital generated and distributed, in papers written,
positions argued, in courts and legislatures, courses and journals, and
carried forward to law offices, dinner tables, bar meetings and judges'
chambers as our graduates move on in their careers.
I. RESPONSES TO-ADVOCATES OF BOTH SIDES
Even in the absence of findings from such an evaluation, I
suggest three responses to the question whether clinical educators have
essentially given up the fight against the oppressions of poverty, by
accepting the compromises inherent in academic employment.
A. This is Not Your Parents' Clinical Legal Education
Steve Wizner proffered the threshold measure, whether today's
clinicians are still "true to the roots of clinical legal education." 3
2. From 1959 through 1965, the Ford Foundation provided grants to nineteen law
schools, and renamed the program in 1968. See Orison S. Marden, CLEPR: Origins and
Programs, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT: LEGAL EDUCATION IN A SERVICE
SETTING 5 (Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility ed. 1973). In 1968,
the Ford Foundation announced its commitment of $12 million to incorporate clinical
education "as an integral part" of the nation's law school curriculum.
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Staying true to one's roots has moral power and validity for persons,
as for movements. But the War on Poverty, declared in 1964, isn't
every clinic's roots. Most law schools did not start their clinical
programs in the 1970s, prompted by Ford or other benefactors, intent
on soldiering in the War on Poverty.
In fact, clinical education has been part of law schooling for
more than a century, since law students and faculty took part in the
first iteration of legal aid bureaus established for the explicit purpose
to assist people who could not afford to hire a lawyer.4 Respected
legal educators in the first decades of the twentieth century called for
"clinical lawyer schools," and from 1959 through 1978 the Ford
Foundation provided grants to law schools to pilot such programs. But
most law school clinics got their anchor in the academy as a result of
greatl' expanded federal funding through Title IX, from 1978 to
1997, and from the ABA's law school accreditation standard,
amended in 1996, which requires law schools to provide "real-life
practice experience," without emphasis on the professional ethic or
clinical tradition to provide legal representation to those whom the bar
customarily leaves unrepresented. The progress of clinical legal
education from anti-poverty endeavor to mainstream academe was
further aided by the MacCrate Report which, in 1992, referenced
lawyers' roles in securing justice for the poor, but devoted most of its
heft to shift professional skills and values training from law firms to
law schools.7
Sadly then, I conclude that Steve has overstated the extent to
which there is today one 'clinical legal education movement.' Look
3. See Stephen Wizner, Remarks at the Conference and Dinner Celebrating 30 Years of
Clinical Legal Education at the University of Maryland School of Law (April 2, 2004)
(transcript on file with the University of Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender &
Class).
4. The development of legal aid bureaus around 1900 is detailed in Jerold Auerbach's
classic, UNEQUAL JUSTICE (1976). The participation of law students and faculty has been
recounted by Peter Joy. See Peter Joy, The Law School Clinic as Model Ethical Law Office,
University of Washington Faculty Working Paper Series (October 1, 2003) (unpublished
manuscript at http://ls.wustl.edu/Academics/Faculty/Workingpapers/index.html) [hereinafter
Joy].
5. Joy, supra note 4, at 41.
6. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS §
302(c)(2) (2002).
7. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND
THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
-AN EDUCATIONAL CURRICULUM (1992) (popularly known as the MacCrate Report).
Commentators at the time decried the depoliticization and conversion of much of clinical
education to vocational legal education. See Jon Dubin, Clinical Design for Social Justice
Imperatives, 51 SMU L. Rev. 1461, 1466 n. 28 (1998).
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around at the techno-clinics, designed essentially to impart lawyer
skills, law office management and technology, or to enhance
substantive specialties in which law schools compete for students.
Consider the proliferation of clinics featuring international, business,
health care, and environmental and land use law. The Association of
American Law Schools (AALS) 8 and Clinical Legal Education
Association (CLEA)9 formally embrace this justice-neutered view of
clinical education.
My purpose here is not to demean the educational value of
these developments, nor their potential for public service, but only to
note that law school clinics have grown like kudzu-viewed by some
longtime denizens of legal academia as a costly invading species, and
subjected to a variety of management strategies by law school deans.
Experiential education has won fans far beyond the anti-poverty field
as an effective methodology for honing students' skills and
competencies for practice, and it appeals to many applicants while
affording a new vein of interdisciplinary scholarship to exploit. A
good clinical program is a savvy marketing strategy for law schools
today.
The situation may be better, or may be worse, than we think.
Better in that during the same period in which clinics have gone in-
house and mainstream, American law schools have been incubating a
tremendous array of clinics, courses, externships, centers, symposia,
alternative journals, public interest programs, mentoring opportunities,
and student organizations, many of which facilitate law students'
engagement with the justice dilemmas of today, and many of which do
encompass the harms associated with poverty.l0
8. Although I expect many teachers share the view that clinical education is more a
philosophy of the lawyer's role in society, than it is a mere methodology, the Association of
American Law Schools embraces the method view.
Both clinics and pro bono programs serve important educational values. They each
provide students an opportunity to learn about the legal needs of people who are poor [and] the
satisfactions of serving a client. But the principal goal of most clinics is to teach students
lawyering skills and sensitivity to ethical issues through structured practice experiences and
opportunities to think about and analyze those experiences. Association of American Law
Schools, Learning to Serve at http://www.aals.org/probono/report.html (1998).
9. See Clinical Legal Education Association Bylaws, at
http://www.cleaweb.org/about/bylaws.html.
10. It would be interesting to learn how, if at all, these are related in their origins or
operations, to clinical courses. To what extent is this growth supporting, or independent of,
the original clinical legal education project of redressing the injustices associated with
poverty? Are they sought by students who aim to do this work after graduation, and if so, are
they useful to that aim?
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On the other hand, it may be worse in that the justice needs and
claims of the poor are arguably at their weakest since the 1940's (and
without the employment boom that accompanied the U.S. entry into
World War II). In economic terms, 35.9 million children, women and
men, remain enmeshed in poverty across the U.S.:" hungry, homeless
or scantily housed, working hard at dodging the pandemics of violence
in public streets and private spaces, ill-served by school systems,
scraping by with too little income gained at the cost of wearying hours
and the shrinkage of wages, welfare, and hours in the day to hold it all
together, much less advance on the ladders of opportunity available to
people of means. Socially and politically, the poor are
disenfranchised, profoundly isolated from the institutions that make
the rules, with insufficient allies (such as labor unions, churches, and
credible protest leaders of the justice movements of the civil rights era,
or media outlets) to get traction in the political conversations and
budgetary decisions at any level of government or industry.
B. The Possibility that [Doing] Less is More
One tension between 'teaching' and 'doing' in clinical
education is the vexing dilemma about what is "more" legal assistance
for poor and disadvantaged clients. In this symposium, Steve Wizner
emphasized the quantitative, bemoaning the tradeoff in the number of
clients represented, and the number of hours and brain cells expended
in academic commitments far-removed from getting justice for poor
clients.' 2 Jane Aiken underscored the qualitative opportunity in that
numerosity tradeoff: clinical teachers' scholarship, augmented by
their faculty membership, may importantly increase the venues for
advocacy to redress the legal harms suffered by our clients.' 3 These
perspectives necessarily conflict in the lives of clinicians who strive to
achieve a balance that satisfies one's conscience as well as one's
employing academic institution.
While many clinicians feel the rub of writing requirements, and
may mutter, "When has a law review article ever changed the world
for my clients? This isn't the best use of my time!" there is some
11. U.S. Census Bureau News, Income Stable, Poverty Up, Numbers of Americans With
and Without Health Insurance Rise, Census Bureau Reports at http://www.census.gov/Press-
Release/www/releases/archives/incomewealth/002484.html.
12. See Stephen Wizner, Walking the Clinical Tightrope: Between Doing and Teaching,
4 U. MD. L. J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 264-66 (2004).
13. See Jane H. Aiken, Walking the Clinical Tightrope: Embracing the Role of Teacher,
4 U. MD. L. J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 270-72 (2004).
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evidence supporting the view that the discipline of practice-informed
scholarship carries forward the seeds of legal change and increased
justice. 14
The utility of scholarship in legal-theory development was
embraced in the classic expositions of clinical legal education in the
United States. They focus on teaching students the methodology of
reflection-upon-practice, and teaching for the big stage of lawyers
embedded in the justice needs of their era, not just the small arena of
effective mastery of lawyerly skills. Gary Bellow urged the focused
interrogation of students' performances in the roles of lawyer, so as to
foster introspection that facilitates understanding of lawyering and the
"legal order."' 15  Similarly, Tony Amsterdam emphasized teaching
students how to learn systematically from experience, embedded in the
rich and uncontrolled realities of the facts of clients' lives as entangled
in the law.' 
6
Each of these giants has modeled useful reflection-in-
scholarship. Subsequently, legal educators drew on theorists of
professional development, who have stressed that the most effective
professionals differentiate from their peers by developing the ability to
learn well from reflection on one's actions, so as to transform raw
conduct into meaningful experience.17
C. The Dichotomy is not Legal Theory v. Law Practice
In the CLEPR era, virtually every clinical teacher came into the
academy from the front lines of legal services and public defender
offices. They did so seeking to remain useful and effective for clients,
to replenish the ranks by preparing new advocates, and to persist for
the long haul in combating the legal fallout of poverty. Oh, sure, law
schools offer better pay and benefits, and a somewhat more civil arena
14. Based on their practice choices and publications, I believe Steve and Jane actually
agree, as lawyers and educators, that effective legal representation for disadvantaged people
includes, in addition to the social good in achieving immediate results for individuals, the
importance of changing the legal rules and relationships that constrain our poor clients, and
the utility of some legal scholarship and faculty membership for their advocacy work.
15. See Gary Bellow, On Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary Reflections on
Clinical Education As Methodology, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT: LEGAL
EDUCATION IN A SERVICE SETTING 374 (Council on Legal Education for Professional
Responsibility ed., 1973).
16. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education-A 21st-Century
Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 612, 616 (1984).
17. See, e.g., DONALD A. SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: How PROFESSIONALS
THINK IN ACTION 21-69, 128-67, 287-354 (1984).
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than the lower courts to engage ideas for achieving justice in disputes
involving the poor. But largely, it is the frustration with the limitations
of conventional advocacy to effect meaningful change in the legal
arrangements that repeatedly ensnare poor people, 18  which drove
many to seek the regenerative potential in the intellectual resources of
law schools.
A primary purpose of much of the best legal scholarship is to
challenge the reigning structure of legal rules and constraining
institutions. 19 In this volume, scholarship is offered as a partial offset
for the diminution in direct legal representation of clients. The
soundness of that argument turns on the characteristics of that
scholarship. Social justice clinicians may add, beyond the usual
qualities, the question of where to publish, and for whom-in the
pages of a law review, versus an op-ed in a national newspaper with a
circulation of millions20 or other media such as interactive websites.
But expanding one's search for and assessment of legal scholarships
beyond law reviews supports rather than minimizes the importance of
social justice practitioners studying, generating, and "doing theory."
The development of transformative legal theory arises
repeatedly on the front lines, and interdependently with the works of
scholars. Two examples of transformative litigation familiar to anti-
poverty lawyers and clinicians illustrate this point, Goldberg v. Kelly
2 1
and Javins v. First National Realty.
22
Goldberg v. Kelly ushered in the civil due process revolution.
In holding that an adversarial hearing was required prior to termination
of subsistence benefits, the U.S. Supreme Court accorded to poor
people the same procedural protections that the privileged traditionally
enjoyed for their property interests. Justice Brennan's opinion in Kelly
extended the arguments of John Kelly's lawyers into a synthesis of
academic and philosophical insights about the nature of property, and
then, into the imperative idiom of constitutional law. Counsel and
18. Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 34
NLADA BRIEFCASE 106 (1977); Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead:
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'y REV. 95 (1974).
19. One example would be the development of the tort of sexual harassment under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT
OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979).
20. On the relative merits of publishing for wider audiences, see Douglas L. Colbert,
Broadening Scholarship: Embracing Law Reform and Justice, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 540, 546
(2002).
21. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
22. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
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Court alike were deeply influenced by legal scholarship, in particular
Charles Reich's The New Property, published in 1964.23
This revolutionary conceptualization has rocked welfare rights
advocacy ever since. Mr. Kelly's lawyers were pioneers in poverty
law, and included Steve Wizner and Ed Sparer among others, who
worked at that time in the first neighborhood legal services program,
Mobilization for Youth Legal Services, and thereafter has been
seasoned in their work as scholars and teachers as well.24
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp.25 also illustrates the vital
interdependence of justice-seeking scholarship and justice-serving
representation. The 1970 D.C. Circuit case widely regarded as the
bellwether of the revolution in landlord-tenant law, legal services
lawyers argued a theory that had some predicates in scholarly literature
and in obscure case law. Leaping the divide from property to contract,
Judge Skelly Wright recognized a contract-like 'warranty' of
habitability by landlords taking poor folks' money for housing, on the
theory that the rental of an urban apartment was closer kin to the
purchase of modem-day goods made by distant producers covered by
warranties of merchantability.26 Brilliant!
Javins was not conceived without progenitors, for like other
important steps in the litigation trail to modem tenants rights, Javins
had been preceded by a large literature of scholarly critiques of the
outmoded nature of landlord-tenant law.27 Additional tools in lawyers'
hands were a few reported cases that had taken similar paths in other
23. See Sylvia A. Law, Some Reflection on Goldberg v. Kelly at Twenty Years, 56
BROOK. L. REv. 805 (1990). Sylvia Law relates a further blending of the sites of theory-
building, noting that the amicus brief filed in support of Mr. Kelly by the National Institute for
Education in Law and Poverty, (whose successor publishes Clearinghouse Review), was
signed by Christopher N. May, of counsel-who had authored the note, May, Withdrawal of
Public Welfare: The Right to a Prior Hearing, 76 YALE L.J. 1234 (1967). See also Law at
808 n.9 (1990).
24. Sylvia Law credits Ed Sparer as the intellectual architect of Goldberg v. Kelly and
much welfare rights advocacy in that era. Id. at 819. Sparer's work over his life demonstrates
both the possibility and importance of faculty members' work in both domains of theory and
representation. It also reveals the synergy between legal-theory building and thoughtful
practice. Sparer was an influential advocate, a practitioner of engaged legal scholarship,
founder of the Health Law Project and Professor of Law and Social Policy at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School, and the inspiration for the annual conference that bears his name.
25. 428 F.2d 1071, 1074-80 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Hiram Lesar, Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1279
(1960); Thomas M. Quinn & Earl Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical
Evaluation of the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REv. 225 (1969);
Robert S. Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposals for Change, 54 GEO. L.J.
519 (1969).
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28jurisdictions, and the use of housing codes to define habitability.
These important factors prepared the way for revolutionary change but
could not self-execute. What ignited them was the passionate pursuit
of social and racial justice generated by the movements for civil rights.
In Kelly and in Javins, of course, it mattered that there were
lawyers who listened to clients, and presumably were touched and
taught by their struggles, as much clinical scholarship observes. 29 Yet
to harness this form of highly relational legal service to the engines of
imperative legal change, surely there is room in a contemporary
movement for freedom from poverty for activists who build theory and
argue for it, in every venue, clinic, classroom, courtroom, and branch
of public discourse.
In which case, let's make the argument between teaching and
doing a productive one. Do the ways we "teach" engage students in
doing now, and preparing for the long-haul lawyering that any
movement for social change requires?
II. WHAT THE WORLD NEEDS Now
Kelly and Javins illustrate a truth about significant legal
change, which is discomforting for the assessment of much clinical
legal education as preparation for a renewed war on poverty's
injustice. Antipoverty work requires its agents to act "not as a mirror
to reflect the world, but as a hammer with which to shape it."' 30 The
lawyers' work in these two cases would not have made the differences
they did for millions of urban tenants or benefits-holders, in the form
of legal rights and material progress, unless the lawyers on the scene
were prepared and capable in several key respects The Kelly and
Javins lawyers were prepared to recognize the pattern created by
extant legal rules that systematically injured many people of limited
means, and to imagine a more just legal rule and rationale, as well as
28. See Ingalls v. Hobbs, 31 N.E. 286 (Mass. 1892); see also Gladden v. Walker &
Dunlop 168 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (landlord has duty to maintain portions of apartment
'under his control' including plumbing, heating and electrical systems); J. D. Young Corp. v.
McClintic, 26 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) (implied covenant of fitness in lease of
building under construction); Steefel v. Rothschild, 72 N.E. 112 (N.Y. 1904) (duty to disclose
latent defects).
29. See J.P. Ogilvy and Karen Czapanskiy, Clinical Legal Education: An Annotated
Bibliography, 7 CLINICAL L. REv. SI (2nd ed. 2001).
30. The quote is widely attributed to Bertoldt Brecht, who was speaking of artists. See
Ascanio Piomelli, Appreciating Collaborative Lawyering, 6 CLINICAL L. REv. 427, 431 n. 22
(2000).
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to make or seize the opportunity to advance claims to produce more
just results. The lawyers commandeered theory where they could find
it, in the constitution and in the primordial ooze of common law
precedent. Their narration of material facts had less to do with their
clients' individualized experiences, than with the summative burden of
law's hubristic dominance on the poor generally. 3 1
This is discomforting for much of clinical course design,
curriculum, and teaching methodology, because hewing close to
clients' individualized experience is the most familiar, and least
controversial, image of lawyers in society. Coaching students to
master the paradigmatic skills of client service is similarly the least
controversial norm of clinical education. Yet, the constitutional
democracy on which legal education's organization is premised (as is
widely argued by innumerable academics, activists, and others across
the U.S.) is being disassembled by a cadre of lawyers operating in
government, private industry, and a welter of consultancies while
many of us discuss taped interviews. A contemporary CLEPR would,
I hope, fund strong forms of social justice advocacy, rather than the
vague profusion of preliminary practice skills that characterizes many
clinics' curricula today.
CLEPR, like Kelly and Javins, did not spring from the heads of
lawyers who were inured to. the larger society. The civil rights
movement that surfaced after World War II as a struggle against
segregation in the South had become a national effort by the 1960's.
In 1963, Martin Luther King, Jr. gave his "I Have a Dream" speech,
and in the March on Washington, 200,000 people assembled to
demand racial justice. President Johnson declared the "War on
Poverty" in March 1964 and, in July, signed the Civil Rights Act of
1964. From 1965-1967, riots erupted in Watts, Cleveland, Chicago,
Atlanta, Detroit, and then in Washington, D.C. In the same years,
professional journalists brought the Vietnam War into American living
rooms, and the ready availability of information to counterbalance
official policy fed the zeitgeist to 'question authority' and challenge
established interests. As U.S. casualties exceeded 6,000 by 1967,
protests drew from 50-100,000 people in several cities. In the spring
of 1968, opposition was so intense that President Johnson felt
compelled to announce that he would not seek reelection.
Today, the need is equally as great for lawyers with appetite
and expectation for serious struggle over the basic rules of the legal
31. It is also imperative that lawyers realized they were adjuncts to popular movements,
rather than free agents.
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order. In the War on Poverty era that birthed the modem clinical legal
education movement, the fact that thousands of young lawyers felt
compelled by the social ferment of that time suggests two lessons for
us educators. First, remember what lawyers are good for. The present
time is no less fractious than the 1960s. Although the issues may be
framed differently now, it is predictable who will remain at the bottom
of the jurisprudential well. Unless poor people and their advocates rise
on the social currents of this day to deploy all the tools of the law-
legal theory, legal process, legal rulemaking, law enforcement, as well
as standard advocacy skills and lawyer functions commonly taught in
experiential courses. Needed now are theories and practices that
support liberty and opportunity for the poor and disenfranchised, in
their contests with the rich and super-franchised.
Second, social currents are not just found, they can be
influenced, and not only by unanticipated triggering events, but by
persistent, systematic work to move ideas and beliefs. 32  Many
activists from the 1960s on say that the racial and economic caste
system compelled them to stand for justice: against segregation, for
voting rights, for legal norms that would embrace a more inclusive
social contract. But the truth also is that the legal effort to dismantle
discrimination had been underway for generations, chipping away
tirelessly, and making the road for the aggressive struggles of the
1960s and 1970s. Neither element of the Civil Rights Movement
would have been possible without lawyer-law professor-dean Charles
Hamilton Houston. Houston designed, not a clinical course, but a law
school whose curriculum he organized to equip lawyers for their
essential duty as social engineers. "A lawyer's either a social engineer
or he's a parasite on society," he taught.33 A social engineer is "A
highly skilled, perceptive, sensitive lawyer who understood the
Constitution of the United States and knew how to explore its uses in
the solving of 'problems of local communities' and in 'bettering
conditions of the underprivileged citizens.'
34
32. The contemporary conservative ascendancy in American law, governance and
politics is one telling illustration. By one estimate, this trend has been facilitated by effective
strategies that 79 conservative foundations have used to support the activities of 350 right-
wing think tanks intending to reshape public policy at the federal, state, and local levels. See,
e.g., JEFF KREHELY ET AL., NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR RESPONSIVE PHILANTHROPY, AXIS OF
IDEOLOGY: CONSERVATIVE FOUNDATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY (2004), at
http://www.ncrp.org/PDF/Axisofldeology-ExecutiveS'ummary.pdf.
33. GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 84 (1983).
34. Id.
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All legal teaching teaches about both law and practice, yet not
all learning-by-doing teaches students that it is just, and possible, to
aid the poor or dismantle poverty. Not enough law teaching makes
this attempt; and much doing focuses the eye on a smaller prize.
While a single clinical course may begin to move students toward
skillful advocacy and theory development and strategic practice, and
then ... what? It is not common to teach the extensive legal and
social history of resistance and reformation from which to take heart.
We need to do a better job of sharing what we have discovered about
the transferability of the processes for devising and delivering legal
change that supports material, social and political inclusion for our
clients.
It is daunting to undertake teaching that bridges the theory-
practice duality, but it is surely important to help students to harness
the understandings achieved by the synergy of head, hand and heart, in
order to raise up each generation of warriors for justice for the poor.
Cognitive learning is not sufficient to educate about the entrenchment
of law in poverty's cruelties and to alter students' map of the legal
world.35 Nor is "doing" alone sufficient to equip most law students as
capable lawyers for poor people facing the complex, commingled legal
harms they endure. "Teaching"-through readings, records, research,
discussion, writing, didactics, modeling, field work, observation-is
also necessary to equip students with rule-mastery, and operational
command of the legal rules and policies. The key reason to combine
teaching and doing is to optimize learning, especially the lesson that
law is open-textured, chock-full of choices and opportunities to
reframe the disputes, and thus to unsettle the ordinary workings of the
law which so often disadvantage poor people. Retaining time in the
course for explicit teaching is enormously useful in helping students to
learn, together, particularly from materials and experiences that run
counter to the implicit culture of law-schooling that the most disabling
of law's inequities lie outside the rules themselves.
35. Too much "unexamined stuff" is taught implicitly in first year doctrinal courses,
including limiting notions of lawyers' responsibilities, aggrandized notions of the neutrality of
legal precedent and process, and unstated premises that lawyers are available to all parties who
have serious claims and that their counsel are "equal." If we leave it unexamined in
experiential courses, we cannot count on that neat package-exonerating lawyers, enervating
poor people-coming undone.
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III. No TIME LIKE THE PRESENT
Ditching the useless dichotomy is all the more important at this
political moment, when the claims of the poor need some new legal
traction. To continue to slog uphill in this vein, students need to know
that they are gaining a skill set more specific than some "experience";
and they need more than reflection that affords a glimpse of the
inequities in power, privilege, exclusion and oppression. Whether the
social struggles to come are supported by legal arguments made in
familiar doctrinal categories, or sound in civil and human rights, or
church-state separation, or taxation and capital market regulation, here
is a short list of predicate skills which are essential in becoming
prepared for the work of striving against the status quo of poverty
amid riches. We can aim to equip our students with the contextual,
sensate, and rigorously observed recognition of the following: (1) that
legal rules are produced in response to evidentiary accounts, which do
not exist until constructed by lawyers; (2) that parties' different
perspectives, and their different opportunities for representation by
counsel, importantly shape such factual accounts; (3) that clients,
lawyers, and judges all face a range of choices for resolving
"doctrinal" questions-legal rules are not self-executing; that the class,
gender, and race of the people implicated by legal disputes may
influence the operation of legal decision-making at each of these
junctures; and (4) that lawyers play various, sometimes significant
roles, in causing many of the legal problems of poor and
disenfranchised people.
This is a set of preliminaries for students beginning their
training, of course. Effective lawyering requires fluency in the law
that comes with further experience and practice than law school clinics
can offer-a deep and practical understanding of law as the language
for speaking norms of justice, and a toolbox of customary rites for
settling disputes, unsettling oppression, and resolving social conflicts.
IV. LOOKING TOWARD THE LONGITUDINAL LAWYER SCHOOL
No one clinic can do it all; and trimming clinics to focus too
narrowly risks evading the meaningful arena altogether. Many law
clinics affirm or imbue students with the readiness, will and ability to
battle social injustice. This is important, worthwhile, and ... just the
beginning. Multiple clinic opportunities, indeed concentrations of
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study in the welter of knowledge- and capacity-types pertinent to
social justice work, can aid in preparing new lawyers for the rigors of
this life's work. Because institutions differ widely in their
commitments and resources, other enhancements of social justice
teaching and learning are needed, such as clinics' connections with
non-clinic courses, 36 and ramped-up curriculum-advising. Beyond the
J.D., more intentional and collegially supported forms of mentoring
and post-graduation encouragement of alumni are demonstrably
important in our local communities. Law school clinics and faculty
could forge fuller collaborative connections between clinics and the
progressive bar, including many legal services providers, through
visiting practitioners, co-counseling relationships, and the design of
symposia that bring together the relative strengths and perspectives of
'the academy' and 'the field.'3 7
Even in the absence of a contemporary CLEPR to underwrite
the effort, we in the social justice wing of clinical legal education
would do well to devise longitudinal modes of social justice
instruction-wider and deeper during law schooling, and extended
through various forms of post-degree collaboration and cross-
fertilization between sites of social justice practice. The Wizner/Aiken
debate can be the last occasion on which experienced clinical
educators oversell the dichotomy between the teaching and doing of
their work, and its corollary, the dichotomy of practice versus theory,
provided we embrace the critical dialectic of robust, social-justice
"doing-theory."
36. For example, students in a Legal Writing, Analysis, and Research course taught by
Professors Michael Milleman and Steven Schwinn, in conjunction with Renee Hutchins and
her clinic students, developed the legal theories that won freedom for Walter Arvinger,
wrongfully convicted of murder and imprisoned for more than 36 years. After two-years of
work by faculty and students, Governor Erlich commuted Mr. Arvinger's sentence and
released him in December 2004. See University of Maryland School of Law, Walter
Arvinger Defense Team Wins Martin Luther King, Jr. Diversity Awards at
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/news-detail.asp?news=23 (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
37. Just one example is the welfare conference and community conversation held at the
University of Maryland in October 2001. The two-day conference, by design, involved a wide
sector of concerned community participants, as well as national political leaders and legal
scholars, to inform policy makers and identify local action opportunities on the impacts of
welfare policy and administration on no-income and low-income families. See Welfare
Reform Ends: What's Next, IN PRACTICE: NEWSLETTER OF THE CLINICAL & LEGAL THEORY
AND PRAC. PROGRAMS AT U. MD. SCH. L., Fall 2001, at 9.
